Universalizability as necessary for objectivity in morality

In this dissertation, I wish to defend the claim that ethics, and more properly, morality is involved with providing one with guidelines for action and resolving conflict between people's interests in an objective manner through the universalizability principle. In chapter one I shall argue against charges of triviality, vacuousness, and the charge that the generalization principle presents one with vague criteria of what would stand for 'criteria of relevant similarity.' In chapter two I shall argue that Singer's generalization principle is best for objectivity among the different versions of the universalizability principle especially when taken within the context of Singer's complete moral theory. In chapter three I shall examine how it may be possible for Singer's generalizability principle to overcome charges of being too rigid to be applicable, by allowing for exceptions to its rules, and yet still maintain its level of objectivity, and universality. I will conclude that Singer's generalization principle and indeed his entire moral theory is the most plausible, and the most necessary, for providing us with practical and objective guidelines(even if the generalization argument is invalidly derived