Moral progress and philosophical education in Epictetus' philosophy

In the Discourses and the Encheiridion we followed Epictetus as he gave content to the concepts of “moral progress” and “education”, two notions that are of central importance to Stoicism specifically and, more generally, to a retrospective approach to the very practice of philosophy, which would aim at clarifying both the concept of philosophical maturation and that of philosophical education. The ancient Stoic philosophers never succeeded in defining the concept of progress. That is, they did not sufficiently explain the state of the subject who has left the private self, the ordinary man, behind and has entered upon the path of moral perfection but has not yet achieved wisdom. Epictetus attached great importance to the stage of progressing, of advancing, and frequently returned to the definition of it in his Discourses. This “progress” is progress towards virtue, which is the perfection towards which man aspires. The virtuous life is a disciplined life, and the self-discipline that is supposed to accompany virtue has to do with the human characteristics that separate human nature from that of the animals. These characteristics include sagacity, prudence and justice. There is a power to which these characteristics are subservient, however, and that is the power of the will. Man is volition. The man, therefore, who is advancing along the path of self-discipline and moral progress must cultivate his will, so that it may remain free and in accord with nature. Accordance with nature is equivalent to moral progress, while disaccord is the inability to follow the precepts of the natural model, rendering nugatory any effort along the wrong path. It was consequently important – and this is what we did in the fifth sub-chapter of chapter one – that we define the concept of nature, on the basis of what Epictetus himself says about it in the Discourses. This exercise had five elements. We distinguished between the concepts of “natural” and “unnatural”, we situated our research within the definition of “human nature”, and we gave particular weight to the distinction between body and speech, as well as to man’s social nature. Progress, however, can only be achieved within philosophical education. Herein lies Epictetus’ great theoretical contribution. Moral progress is assured as the consequence of the association of the student with the philosopher-teacher. This, too, is a form of self-discipline, which, according to our findings from our study of the Discourses, has three basic orientations. First of all, it focuses on ideas and impressions. Perfection in the functioning of the capacity to make use of impressions is achieved through an apprenticeship that includes specific lessons based on appropriate theorems. The perfection, indeed, of this particular capacity signals the parallel purification of the will. The second concern of a philosophical education is to rectify the “principles”, the opinions, the critical faculty of the subject. The soul that is equipped with sound principles is fortified, immune to pernicious influences; and it is also self-sufficient, free of the need for outside support, since harm and benefit do not come from others, but are bred within the subject by virtue of the corresponding principles. The faculty of judgment, of decision, lies within the absolute and complete dominion of the cognitive and conative subject. What is proposed, therefore, is a discipline focusing on the rectification of principles and the critical faculty, a process that should begin early, in childhood, even though – as Epictetus says – no one readily accepts contestation of his judgment. This necessary examination of one’s judgments and critical faculty takes place pre-eminently in the school of the philosopher. Finally, as Epictetus says, the necessity of education emerges from man’s need to know how to handle the innate concepts (“preconceptions”) of the “reasonable” and the “unreasonable”, in order to apply them to each circumstance in accordance with nature. In general, there is a disaccord with regard to the perception and the content of such concepts as “reasonable” and “unreasonable”, “good” and “bad”, “advantageous” and “disadvantageous”. The object of a philosophical education is the habit of the correct use of preconceptions, which will serve to deter conflicts between people and to deliver them from the misfortune that accompanies a misapplication of preconceptions to the several circumstances of life. With this we conclude our study. We hope that in it we have: -Shed light, first of all, on the figure of Epictetus, for whom, as far as we know, no extensive monograph in Greek has ever been written. - Given content, in the light of the thinking of Epictetus, to the vital (in Stoic philosophy) question of “progress”, an ambiguous notion in the minds of the early Stoics for which they were criticized even in antiquity, and shown how Epictetus reasoned about the matter, making a decisive contribution to its elucidation. - Demonstrated two questions that are part and parcel of philosophical thought, which implies the path and the process of maturation, and which presupposes a philosophical education. I would like, finally, to stress that this dissertation is pre-eminently a response to the need to argue my conviction that philosophy not only has practical repercussions but is also both effective and expedient