What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is-almost anything. Given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors, and given any vector of nondominated strategies. there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of the transformed game. Any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. Some comments on the implications of these results for game theory are included
Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable str...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayes...
What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is almost any...
Abstract We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of ...
We transform a noncooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncert...
We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the un...
Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combinat...
For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities we provide a constructive proof of the existence o...
This note shows that when the Bayes formula and certain game theory concepts are appropriately appli...
We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomple...
We de\u85ne a new concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show tha...
Bayesian equilibrium constitutes the prevailing solution concept for games with incomplete informati...
this paper provides a counterexample to a famous theorem of Aumann (1976) which states that common p...
I consider generalisations of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the idea that in equilibrium the...
Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable str...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayes...
What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is almost any...
Abstract We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of ...
We transform a noncooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncert...
We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the un...
Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combinat...
For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities we provide a constructive proof of the existence o...
This note shows that when the Bayes formula and certain game theory concepts are appropriately appli...
We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomple...
We de\u85ne a new concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show tha...
Bayesian equilibrium constitutes the prevailing solution concept for games with incomplete informati...
this paper provides a counterexample to a famous theorem of Aumann (1976) which states that common p...
I consider generalisations of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the idea that in equilibrium the...
Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable str...
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian ...
We employ the theory of Bayesian potential games to characterize pure-strategy equilibria of a Bayes...