Add to ORKGIn this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices based on the notions of minimal winning coalitions and equal division of pay offs is developed. The family of indices is parameterized by allowing minimal winning coalitions to form in accordance with varying probability functions. These indices are axiomatically characterized and compared to other similarly characterized indices. Additionally, a dual family of minimal blocking coalition indices and their characterization axioms is presented
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
This thesis considers a class of cooperative n-person games (voting games) in which the voters are s...
We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity...
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices...
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices...
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices...
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/3621/5/bam7937.0001.001.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
In this paper, we characterize two power indices introduced in [1] using two different modifications...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
In this paper we discuss on several ways to extend power indices defined on simple games to the cont...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
This thesis considers a class of cooperative n-person games (voting games) in which the voters are s...
We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity...
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices...
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices...
In this probabilistic generalization of the Deegan-Packel power index, a new family of power indices...
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/3621/5/bam7937.0001.001.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
In this paper, we characterize two power indices introduced in [1] using two different modifications...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11Many ...
In this paper we discuss on several ways to extend power indices defined on simple games to the cont...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
This thesis considers a class of cooperative n-person games (voting games) in which the voters are s...
We propose a generalization of simple games to partition function form games based on a monotonicity...