In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit expert opinions to support their positions, and for the tax agency to distinguish among individuals who do and do not solicit expert opinions for the purposes of auditing. We also consider the implications of an ex ante constraint on the tax agency which requires it to treat all taxpayers who take the deduction alike in terms of audit rates, whether or not they solicit an expert opinion. Finally, we examine the effects of regulations which limit the degree of riskiness for which a supporting opinion can be justified as well as the effects of changes in various penalty rates
Governments generally use enforcement methods, such as audits and the imposition of penalties, to de...
This article reports on the results from a small-scale investigation of the compliance effects of a ...
AbstractWe experimentally test the effect of aggressive audit strategies on tax compliance. Taxpayer...
In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit exper...
Individuals are increasingly using expert system tax programs as a substitute for paid professionals...
This paper focuses on the role of the tax agent as a preparer of tax returns and provider of profess...
We develop a game-theoretic model in which taxpayers, tax practitioners and a tax agency all interac...
Empirical work on tax compliance has yielded conservative estimates of unreported taxable income in ...
This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a...
This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a...
Agencies charged with collecting taxes and enforcing the tax code generally use infor-mation provide...
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the role of the tax agent as a preparer of tax returns and ...
In the midst of various taxpayer "revolts" and federal budget deficits of unprecedented magnitude, n...
"Prepared for the Symposium on Taxpayer Compliance Research, National Academy of Sciences, South Pad...
This article has five parts. The second part describes the statutory and regulatory standards for t...
Governments generally use enforcement methods, such as audits and the imposition of penalties, to de...
This article reports on the results from a small-scale investigation of the compliance effects of a ...
AbstractWe experimentally test the effect of aggressive audit strategies on tax compliance. Taxpayer...
In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit exper...
Individuals are increasingly using expert system tax programs as a substitute for paid professionals...
This paper focuses on the role of the tax agent as a preparer of tax returns and provider of profess...
We develop a game-theoretic model in which taxpayers, tax practitioners and a tax agency all interac...
Empirical work on tax compliance has yielded conservative estimates of unreported taxable income in ...
This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a...
This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a...
Agencies charged with collecting taxes and enforcing the tax code generally use infor-mation provide...
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the role of the tax agent as a preparer of tax returns and ...
In the midst of various taxpayer "revolts" and federal budget deficits of unprecedented magnitude, n...
"Prepared for the Symposium on Taxpayer Compliance Research, National Academy of Sciences, South Pad...
This article has five parts. The second part describes the statutory and regulatory standards for t...
Governments generally use enforcement methods, such as audits and the imposition of penalties, to de...
This article reports on the results from a small-scale investigation of the compliance effects of a ...
AbstractWe experimentally test the effect of aggressive audit strategies on tax compliance. Taxpayer...