A Game Theory Analysis of Firm Reaction to External Organizational Demands: The Case of Animal Welfare Standards

There has been increasing public concern about farm animal welfare regarding transportation, slaughter, and some management practices, especially in systems where animals are confined for most of their existence. Animal welfare organizations (groups) have traditionally focused on forwarding their agendas through legislation, although more recent attempts have focused on convincing large firms that buy agricultural commodities to require particular production process standards to be met. The strategic interactions of players in the egg industry are modeled using a game theory approach. Two scenarios were explored: a principal-agent contract model between food firms and farmers, and a model where two firms are targeted by animal activists. The former model was empirically analyzed while the latter model was theoretically examined. Results for the principal-agent contract model indicate that, in general, the decision by the farmer of whether to invest in a free-range production system is dependent on the probability of being caught cheating. Whether contracts will be accepted or rejected by suppliers is dependent on the premium for free-range eggs. Finally, as the amount that can be lost if caught breaching the contract decreases, investment is motivated only with a higher probability of being caught. Theoretical analysis where competition did not matter and animal welfare was not a determinant of demand shows that animal activists must convince food firms that there will be a significant change in revenue with compliance as opposed to rejecting the contract or negotiating a compromise in order to attain their objectives of increased animal welfare