International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for compact preference representation, from which the voters' preferences are elicited and aggregated. Such a language can usually be seen as a domain restriction. We consider a well-known restriction, namely, conditionally lexicographic preferences , where both the relative importance between issues and the preference between the values of an issue may depend on the values taken by more important issues. The naturally associated language consists in describing conditional importance and conditional preference by trees together with conditional preference tables. In this paper, we study the aggregation of conditionally lexicographic pref...
When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues, ap-plying common voting rules becomes computa...
In group decision making, often the agents need to decide on multiple attributes at the same time, s...
In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-...
International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a lang...
International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a lang...
International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a lang...
One approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for compact prefe...
One approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for com-pact pref...
One approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for compact prefe...
In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of...
In many real-world collective decision problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of f...
When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues, one solution is to vote on the issues sequent...
We consider the problem of learning a user's ordinal preferences on a multiattribute domain, assumin...
Hyderabad, IndeIn many real-world collective decision problems,the set of alternatives is a Cartesia...
International audienceSeveral methods exist for making collective decisions on a set of variables wh...
When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues, ap-plying common voting rules becomes computa...
In group decision making, often the agents need to decide on multiple attributes at the same time, s...
In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-...
International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a lang...
International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a lang...
International audienceOne approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a lang...
One approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for compact prefe...
One approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for com-pact pref...
One approach to voting on several interrelated issues consists in using a language for compact prefe...
In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of...
In many real-world collective decision problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of f...
When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues, one solution is to vote on the issues sequent...
We consider the problem of learning a user's ordinal preferences on a multiattribute domain, assumin...
Hyderabad, IndeIn many real-world collective decision problems,the set of alternatives is a Cartesia...
International audienceSeveral methods exist for making collective decisions on a set of variables wh...
When agents need to make decisions on multiple issues, ap-plying common voting rules becomes computa...
In group decision making, often the agents need to decide on multiple attributes at the same time, s...
In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-...