Winning Hearts and Minds: Population-centric Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus Federal District

In International Relations, war and security comprise a large role because it generally affects multiple countries. The insurgency in the North Caucasus Federal District is not only a threat to stability in the region or the Russian Federation, but to international peace and security as a whole. The Caucasus Emirate terrorist organization has declared jihad against the Russian government and any country or individual which they consider wages war against “Muslims”. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian government has implemented an enemy-centric strategy to neutralize insurgent numbers without addressing the root causes of instability in the region such as weak governance, corruption, lack of identity, economic stagnation, and military abuses. In 2010, the Russian government created the North Caucasus Federal District and unveiled a new strategy to counteract the root causes of instability in the region. This thesis analyzes to what extent the Russian government is implementing a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy to bring stability to the North Caucasus Federal District since the new strategy took effect to the end of the year 2012. Population-centric counterinsurgency is a strategy implemented by a government to win the “hearts and minds”, meaning the support of the target population to create an environment of support for the counterinsurgent, whereby support for an insurgency decreases and long-term stability is achieved through nation-building, encompassing the strengthening and maintenance of all forms of national power: the political, informational, military, and economic elements. In this thesis it is framed into three Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs): governance, economic development/essential services, and combat/civil security operations based upon the United States Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3-24. I also address the Russian government’s information campaign to enable stability since psychological warfare comprises a large part of population-centric counterinsurgency. Using ethnography as my method, I travelled to the North Caucasus Federal District for three weeks in the North Caucasus Federal District to observe the implementation of the government’s strategy under the framework of the three LLOs plus information campaign as well as conduct interviews with six Russian citizens: five in the North Caucasus Federal District and one from outside the region, regarding their thoughts on what the government’s strategy in the region. I have also read over 350 articles, news and government reports on the conflict and government’s strategy, some of which I use in this thesis to support or question my findings. One can conclude from this thesis that the Russian government, although still suffering to reform, is making considerable effort to solve the instability in the North Caucasus Federal District through economic development and a country-wide information campaign while still largely failing to gain the trust of the regional population due to gross levels of corruption, a closed political process for the people to decide their future, and continual abuses by military and security personnel who are still determined to solve the instability through violence. I have concluded that the Russian government implements a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in terms of its information campaign and economic development, fails in terms of governance and drastically fails in combat/civil security operations. Keywords: Caucasus Emirate, Chechnya, Counterinsurgency, Dagestan, Hearts and Minds, Ingushetia, International Relations, Jihad, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Caucasus, North Caucasus Federal District, North Ossetia, Population-centric Counterinsurgency, Russi