Producción CientíficaComputer simulations are used to evaluate the likelihood of consistent outcomes under the class of majorities based on diference in support. These majorities require certain consensus in collective preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. More precisely, individuals show preference intensities in the unit interval among each pair of alternatives and it is required that the winner alternative obtains a diference in the sum of the intensities with respect to the loser alternative. This diference is a real number located between 0 and the total number of voters. We introduce the values of the required threshold for which majorities based on diference in support lead to transitive and triple-acyclic collective d...
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed n...
Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson...
International audienceIn most of the social choice literature dealing with the computation of the ex...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
A common criticism to simple majority voting rule is the slight support that such rule demands to de...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyc...
Simple majority is one of the most used decision rules in practice. However, under this decision rul...
General conclusions relating pairwise tallies with positional (e.g., plurality, antiplurality (``vot...
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of t...
Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feas...
Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice theory in order to de...
A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is r...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r < m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed n...
Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson...
International audienceIn most of the social choice literature dealing with the computation of the ex...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
A common criticism to simple majority voting rule is the slight support that such rule demands to de...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
In this paper we study to what extent majorities based on difference in support leads to triple-acyc...
Simple majority is one of the most used decision rules in practice. However, under this decision rul...
General conclusions relating pairwise tallies with positional (e.g., plurality, antiplurality (``vot...
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of t...
Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feas...
Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice theory in order to de...
A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is r...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r < m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed n...
Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson...
International audienceIn most of the social choice literature dealing with the computation of the ex...