Crossing Hands in the Russian Cards Problem

When communicating using an unconditionally secure protocol, a sender and receiver is able to transmit secret information over a public, insecure channel without fear of the secret being intercepted by a third party. The Russian cards problem is an example of an unconditionally secure protocol where the communication is fully understandable for everyone listening in. Even though everyone can understand what is being said, only the sender and receiver are able to uncover the secrets being transmitted. In this thesis we investigate the interaction among the communicating parties. By extending existing problem-specific software we are able to more efficiently analyze protocols, and we are therefore able to provide an answer to an open problem in the literature. We provide a completely new solution to the Russian cards protocol and show that it fulfills all requirements by the problem. Discovering this new solution provides the person initiating the protocol two new strategies to choose from when constructing the initial announcement of the protocol