Cameras in the United States Supreme Court: Judicial Transparency & the Obligation Thereof

The sources utilized in this thesis each serve a particular function in relation to the theoretical framework. They are organized by the extent to which they contribute to the three dominant disciplinary approaches found throughout the work. The established literature referenced in the first section contributes to the historical summary of the Supreme Court’s forward progression toward the public disclosure of its work. Many sources used therein are primary, as they are meant to portray contemporary accounts of the Court’s steps as they occur in time. The sources used in the second section help to develop transparency as a demanded intangibility—a commodity of sorts. Hopefully, understanding transparency as a resource for the public will allow for the reader of this thesis to make sense of the concept’s variable application in all parts of the federal government. In the third section, the sources used are distinct in that they are meant to help conceptualize the potential consequences of implementing cameras in the Supreme Court. Identifying the public’s stance on issues related to the Supreme Court itself is necessary to any speculation regarding the consequences. This is because they affect the public both directly and indirectly. In this final section, much of the literature also includes pre-fabricated ideas about what could potentially happen if the institution were to tolerate televised coverage of proceedings. In my own assessment, I am skeptical of the reasoning in positions for both the affirmative and the negative, but I ultimately side with those—and with others in part—whom I feel better represent my ideas regarding the Court’s future. This summary view is expressed in the second subsection of Chapter III and elaborated in the conclusion of this thesis. In our democracy (a constitutional republic) the value of transparency cannot be overstated, as it provides a monitorial means through which the electorate can ensure their interests are maintained by those who make decisions on their behalf. Nonetheless, whether the obligation of transparency should be taken to apply throughout the government co-equally—and specifically, in the nation’s highest court—has become subject to disagreement. Though the benefits of increasing transparency in the U.S. Supreme Court are indeed significant, doing so by permitting video cameras for court proceedings in an era of considerable ideological polarization may also yield unwanted consequences that should discourage efforts toward any implementation policy at this point in time. To properly assess and respond to the debate regarding cameras in the Court, this work begins with a historical discussion, covering a near-comprehensive timeline of the institution’s progression in public disclosure. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the extent to which the Court has already become the most transparent branch of the federal government. This thesis then proceeds to evaluate the potential outcomes of camera implementation while making sense of the societal context in which the debate persists. The idea of government transparency is a theme discussed throughout the work, as it is the fundamental demand that underlies the relevant debate. This thesis endeavors to address the debate regarding whether video cameras ought to be allowed in the United States Supreme Court. Prior to joining the relevant discussion, I provide a comprehensive history of the Court’s steps toward increased transparency, beginning with the institution’s inception. This section highlights the evolving role of transparency in the context of institutional independence—a context that persists emphatically today. The following section describes the role and degree of transparency in the elected branches of the federal government. It contrasts the obligation of disclosure in these branches with that of the Judiciary and also seeks to identify the propriety of selective disclosure in each of the three. Then, this thesis focuses on the prospect of video camera implementation. I have chosen to dissect the positive and negative consequences that might occur should the Court lift the current device ban. In the final section, I compare the consequences, then proceed to argue that the probable negatives cause concerns that should outweigh the potential benefits. I believe that camera implementation can happen without compromising the Supreme Court’s ability to function properly, but only if society changes. In this section, I discuss the societal polarization that makes a policy allowing cameras so dangerous, and I detail the developments that must take place if the Court is to progress safely