This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median voter in a Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real co-players has a negative effect on the median voter's tax rate choice. Further, perceived income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not play a role in the political economy context
This article explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are affected by the structure ...
This article explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are affected by th...
The poor favour redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make...
This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median vote...
This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median vote...
We investigate how social status concerns may affect voters' preferences for redistribution. Social ...
This paper improves the empirical investigation on the effectiveness of the median voter theorem. Us...
Abstract: The classical model developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) stated that democracy will boo...
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a conce...
AbstractSome people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such...
Abstract. This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reason-able assumptions, the ...
While a significant literature in political economy has recently focused on the relationship between...
We investigate whether beliefs about the income distribution are associated with political positions...
Just like economists, voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estim...
Economic voting is multidimensional (covering valence, patrimony and positional dimensions), and a g...
This article explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are affected by the structure ...
This article explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are affected by th...
The poor favour redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make...
This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median vote...
This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median vote...
We investigate how social status concerns may affect voters' preferences for redistribution. Social ...
This paper improves the empirical investigation on the effectiveness of the median voter theorem. Us...
Abstract: The classical model developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) stated that democracy will boo...
Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a conce...
AbstractSome people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such...
Abstract. This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reason-able assumptions, the ...
While a significant literature in political economy has recently focused on the relationship between...
We investigate whether beliefs about the income distribution are associated with political positions...
Just like economists, voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estim...
Economic voting is multidimensional (covering valence, patrimony and positional dimensions), and a g...
This article explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are affected by the structure ...
This article explores how preferences for redistribution among voters are affected by th...
The poor favour redistribution and the rich oppose it, but that is not all. Social mobility may make...