Domestic Obstacles to Labor Standards: Law Enforcement and Informal Institutions in Argentina’s Garment Industry

The obstacles to implementing labor standards in the garment industry have been addressed by a significant body of literature which increasingly considers local institutions. This includes viewing states and government actors as predictors of compliance. Yet fine-grained studies on how the interplay of informal institutions and local actors’ interests prevents standards being implemented are still lacking. Drawing on seven months of ethnographic fieldwork at the main supply center for sweatshop produced and counterfeit clothing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, this article shows how these actors’ tolerance toward the sweatshop economy obstructs the implementation of labor standards. According to empirical evidence, this tolerance means protecting certain actors, i.e. non-enforcing the law. Accordingly, the paper distinguishes between two types of protection: provided by state or by political actors. By uncovering the workings of informal institutions and the political actors’ logics, this article helps to understand why deplorable labor conditions in the garment industry persist.1 Introduction 2 Standards and domestic enforcement in the garment industry 3 Informal institutions and the manipulation of enforcement mechanisms 4 Methods 5 Structural constraints and transformations in the Argentine garment industry 6 Institutions of protection at La Salada 7 Political protection 8 Conclusio