Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976-2005

This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany’s second chamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is often assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat delay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm such an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether and how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threaten to delay the legislative process for an undue length of time. Our study is based on a comprehensive dataset featuring a wealth of information on all bills adopted between 1976 and 2005. We show that divided government delays legislation, but to a somewhat lesser extent than often assumed. We show that under divided government the federal government loses some of its power over the parliamentary calendar – with possible consequences for its ability to implement its political agenda. Interestingly, this finding is not limited to bills that require the consent of the second chamber, but applies to all bills.Introduction Political control of the parliamentary calendar Operationalisation data and summary statistics Testing the hypotheses Summary Footnote