Restraining Regulatory Capture: An Empirical Examination of the Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms

List of Figures and Tables List of Abbreviations Acknowledgments PART I THEORY 1. Introduction Crisis, Newly Mobilizing Societal Actors and Financial Reforms Goals of this Study Capture Theories of Financial Regulatory Reforms The Puzzle: Why did Regulatory Change Occur? Restraining Capture: Salience and Actor Plurality The Power of Diffuse Interests The Overall Argument in Brief Case Selection for Theory-Testing Process-Tracing Plan of the Dissertation 2. A Theory of Financial Regulatory Change Towards a Causal Mechanism of Group-Official Relations Scope Conditions: Crises and Limits of Capture Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity Mobilization of Diffuse Interests Policy Entrepreneurs Government Allies Conceptualization of the Causal Argument 3. Methods Defining Causal Mechanisms Operationalization of Process-Tracing Tests Data Sources PART II THE CASES 4. Winner-Take-All Politics and Diffuse Interests: The US Consumer Regulator Introduction Regulatory Change and Group Influence The Legislative Struggle for the CFPB Advocacy for a new Consumer Finance Regulator Contextual Conditions: Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Environment Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity Mobilization of Diffuse Interests Policy Entrepreneurship Government Allies Conclusions 5. Policy Compromise and Diffuse Interests in Financial Regulation: EU Consumer Finance Reforms Introduction Regulatory Change and Group Influence Contextual Conditions Underlying EU Financial Reforms Advocacy for Regulatory Reform Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity Mobilization of Diffuse Interests Governmental Allies Diffuse Interests, Allies and Consumer Protection Reforms Legislative Initiative 1: New European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) Legislative Initiative 2: European Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) Legislative Initiative 3: Retail Investment Products (PRIPS/KID) Legislative Initiative 4: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MifID II) Conclusions 6. Diffuse Interests and the Limits of Lobbying: Case Study of the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) in the US Introduction Group Influence: From Forbidden Topic to Parliamentary Agenda Advocacy for a FTT Contextual Conditions Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity Mobilization of Diffuse Interests and Coalitions Not Forged Weak Governmental Allies Conclusions 7. Diffuse Interests and the Limits of Capture: Case Study of the EU FTT Introduction Regulatory Change and Group Influence The Policy Debate Advocacy for a Financial Transaction Tax Contextual Conditions: Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Environment Political Opportunities: Access and Receptivity Mobilization of Diffuse Interests Government Allies Changed Contextual Conditions: Low-salience Politics Conclusions PART III EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 8. Conclusion Summarizing the Argument The Explanation of Success Comparative Case Studies Diffuse Interests in Transatlantic Comparison Business Power Cooptation Return to Pluralism Limitations and Future Research How to Mitigate Capture in Regulatory Decision Making 9. Appendix List of Conducted Interviews Bibliograph