Inter-sectoral goods and labor market relationships, international capital mobility, and US trade politics in the 1980s

This research undertakes a specific-factors analysis of trade politics in a world of crossborder capital mobility and finds that inter-sectoral goods market relationships, as well as labor mobility, do influence the patterns of industry lobbying for trade protection when foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the US. I study inter-sectoral goods markets by exploiting input-output tables on the structure of the American economy prepared periodically by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. Commerce Department. I show that sales or purchase dependencies affect a sector's lobbying for trade protection when "neighboring" sectors receive FDI. I also show that the level of inter-sectoral labor mobility affects industry lobbying because FDI-receiving sectors usually pull labor from other sectors. Industry lobbying for trade protection is measured by (1) financial contributions to the political campaigns of members of Congress who vote for a protectionist bill; and (2) petitions filed with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) requesting antidumping or countervailing duties during the five Congressional periods (1981 - 1990)