Reversing Illiberalism: An analysis of the domestic factors determining the EU's post-accession leverage capabilities

Comparisons between the EU’s success in Romania and failure in Hungary raise an important question: what explains the variation in outcomes given the EU’s attempts in both cases to compel a member state government to reverse illiberal actions? I argue that three factors are most important in explaining this variation. First is trust: if the citizens in the targeted member state place a high level of trust in the EU and a relatively low level of trust in the national government, the government will be more likely to capitulate to EU demands for fear of paying high domestic political costs for defying the EU. Second is friends in high places: if the government is protected from material sanctions by a powerful party group within the European Parliament, the EU will be less likely to use material sanctions against that member state. Third is domestic contention: if the nature of the illiberal actions is such that the government has successfully curbed domestic political competition, the targeted state will be less likely to capitulate to EU demands, since they will have less reason to fear domestic electoral consequences of non-compliance or of incurring sanctions.Bachelor of Art