Protecting the Peace Without Protecting Civilians: The UN Capstone Doctrine and the Prevention of Genocide

Perhaps the most shocking aspect of both the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides is not simply that such large-scale violence could occur, but that it could occur under the direct watch of United Nations peacekeeping forces, prompting several questions. Why did UNAMIR and UNPROFOR fail to protect the targets of genocide and ethnic cleansing? Was it due to factors specific to their staff, to the conflicts themselves or to the state of international politics in the 1990s? Or rather, did UNAMIR and UNPROFOR fail because of factors inherent to the UN system that would preclude almost any mission from being successful? Careful analysis of UN doctrine as expressed in its official documents; the memoirs of UN officials, including UNAMIR and UNPROFOR commanders; and the work of peacekeeping, UN and genocide scholars suggests that the failure of UNAMIR and UNPROFOR to effectively address the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides were not isolated instances. Rather, I argue that these failures were the result of systemic problems within UN peacekeeping, including the Capstone Doctrine, which enshrines the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force as the guiding values of peacekeeping. Complications with these principles were exacerbated by wider problems within the UN system, including its access to resources; bureaucratic inefficiencies related to disputes between UN officials, communications and resource allocation; and politics within the UN Security Council (UNSC), which made member states reluctant to commit adequate troops and resources to peacekeeping missions.Bachelor of Art