The Microfoundations of Inter-Group Rebel Cooperation

Intuitively, rebel groups should ally, as this allows them to maximize their power and fighting efficiency against their target. Yet, groups do not always form alliances, and instead sometimes engage in inter-factional conflict. This raises the question: when and why does cooperation fail to materialize between rebel groups? Using micro-level studies of terrorism, I argue that the strength of groups is typically a function of resources or commodities (such as oil) and their ability to attract state sponsorship. I demonstrate that the access rebel groups have to these two factors— state sponsorship and access to natural resources— ultimately determines the success or failure of rebel alliances. I hypothesize that both access to lootable natural resources and access to state sponsorship leads to increased inter-group alliance, but state sponsorship is a much more powerful indicator of alliance than resources are. I test these hypotheses using a set of Middle Eastern conflicts as case studies, along with preliminary quantitative analysis, which is significant at the 0.013 level.Bachelor of Art