We derive and analyze a Darwinian dynamic model based on a general difference equation population model under the assumption of a trade-off between fertility and survival. Both inherent and density dependent terms are functions of a phenotypic trait (subject to Darwinian evolution) and its population mean. We prove general theorems about the existence and stability of extinction equilibria and the bifurcation of positive equilibria when extinction equilibria destabilize. We apply these results, together with the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) Maximum Principle, to the model when both semelparous and iteroparous traits are available to individuals in the population. We find that if the density terms in the population model are trait in...
Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk–Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (...
Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk–Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (...
AbstractWe define an ESS to be a set of strategies (a coalition) which can persist together through ...
We describe the evolutionary game theoretic methodology for extending a difference equation populati...
We describe the evolutionary game theoretic methodology for extending a difference equation populati...
We describe the evolutionary game theoretic methodology for extending a difference equation populati...
In this paper we study the evolutionary dynamics of delayed maturation in semelparous individuals. W...
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
We extend the ideas of evolutionary dynamics and stability to a very broad class of biological and o...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
The classic Ricker equation xt + 1= bxtexp (- cxt) has positive equilibria for b> 1 that dest...
Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk–Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (...
Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk–Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (...
AbstractWe define an ESS to be a set of strategies (a coalition) which can persist together through ...
We describe the evolutionary game theoretic methodology for extending a difference equation populati...
We describe the evolutionary game theoretic methodology for extending a difference equation populati...
We describe the evolutionary game theoretic methodology for extending a difference equation populati...
In this paper we study the evolutionary dynamics of delayed maturation in semelparous individuals. W...
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an evolutionary strategy that, if adapted by a population...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
We extend the ideas of evolutionary dynamics and stability to a very broad class of biological and o...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
The concept of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has been fundamental to the development of evo...
The classic Ricker equation xt + 1= bxtexp (- cxt) has positive equilibria for b> 1 that dest...
Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk–Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (...
Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk–Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (...
AbstractWe define an ESS to be a set of strategies (a coalition) which can persist together through ...