The Transcendental - Phenomenological Perspective on Intersubjectivity: Various Aspects

AbstractIn the following, we take into consideration, firstly, the specifics on the phenomenological analysis of conscience by referring to the thematic offered by Descartes, Kant and Fichte, namely by those who influenced Husserl in favouring “the transcendental reason” in the philosophical research. For Husserl, the subjective conscience is intentional conscience, and existence is assumed as an existential phenomenon, as an objectual set with sense in conscience. Under these conditions, one of the fundamental preoccupations of pure phenomenology lies in the explanation of sense from the constituent intentionality's perspective that characterizes both the personal transcendental ego and the transcendental intersubjectivity: in fact, the objective sense of the world is intersubjectively developed, only that the transcendental intersubjectivity, as an originary structure for all that exists as a sense, has its focus in the self, in any self, which means that in order to thematize it methodically, it is necessary to start from the transcendental ego. In addition, as the philosopher will state in later works, the world, as an existential phenomenon, is rich in significations that the subject perpetuates or transforms: there is always, for everyone, a predetermined horizon of sense, and on the other side, our subjective conscience always comes with an excess of sense