AbstractAt the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction, security protocols can be specified using multisets rewriting. Such rewriting can be modeled naturally using proof search in linear logic. The linear logic setting also provides a simple mechanism for generating nonces and session and encryption keys via eigenvariables. We illustrate several additional aspects of this direct encoding of protocols into logic. In particular, encrypted data can be seen naturally as an abstract data-type. Entailments between security protocols as linear logic theories can be surprisingly strong. We also illustrate how the well-known connection in linear logic between bipolar formulas and general formulas can be used to show that the asynchronous model of communicat...
When formalizing security protocols, dierent speci cation languages support very dierent reasoning...
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to ...
This paper presents a sound BAN-like logic for reasoning about security protocols with theorem prove...
At the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction, security protocols can be specified using multisets rewriting...
AbstractAt the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction, security protocols can be specified using multisets r...
Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly refe...
Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly refe...
We present a revisited semantics for multiset rewriting founded on the left sequent rules of linear...
Abstract. We present a revisited semantics for multiset rewriting founded on the left sequent rules ...
The adoption of the Dolev-Yao model, an abstraction of se-curity protocols that supports symbolic re...
We study and further develop two language-based techniques for analyzing security protocols. One is ...
AbstractIn this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a firs...
In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-order ...
AbstractThis article is about a breadth-first exploration of logical concepts in cryptography and th...
In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-order ...
When formalizing security protocols, dierent speci cation languages support very dierent reasoning...
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to ...
This paper presents a sound BAN-like logic for reasoning about security protocols with theorem prove...
At the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction, security protocols can be specified using multisets rewriting...
AbstractAt the Dolev-Yao level of abstraction, security protocols can be specified using multisets r...
Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly refe...
Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly refe...
We present a revisited semantics for multiset rewriting founded on the left sequent rules of linear...
Abstract. We present a revisited semantics for multiset rewriting founded on the left sequent rules ...
The adoption of the Dolev-Yao model, an abstraction of se-curity protocols that supports symbolic re...
We study and further develop two language-based techniques for analyzing security protocols. One is ...
AbstractIn this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a firs...
In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-order ...
AbstractThis article is about a breadth-first exploration of logical concepts in cryptography and th...
In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-order ...
When formalizing security protocols, dierent speci cation languages support very dierent reasoning...
Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to ...
This paper presents a sound BAN-like logic for reasoning about security protocols with theorem prove...