AbstractThis paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible
Abstract In this study, we deal with the optimal mutual inspection policies (OMIP) for a manufacture...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
<p>In transactions where costly efforts from both the seller and the buyer help prevent selling to t...
AbstractThis paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static...
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control ...
We investigate product quality under different market forms (monopoly vs. perfect competition) and u...
We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer giv...
We analyze a procurement problem in which the quality of the delivered product can be observed perfe...
A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have p...
A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain quality. Quality deter...
Quality evaluation decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information background...
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control ...
Quality certification not only informs consumers, but also stimulates producers to supply better qua...
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations in the pres-ence of adverse ...
The procurement of supplies is often conducted through the buyer analogue of an auction. Sealed bids...
Abstract In this study, we deal with the optimal mutual inspection policies (OMIP) for a manufacture...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
<p>In transactions where costly efforts from both the seller and the buyer help prevent selling to t...
AbstractThis paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static...
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control ...
We investigate product quality under different market forms (monopoly vs. perfect competition) and u...
We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer giv...
We analyze a procurement problem in which the quality of the delivered product can be observed perfe...
A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have p...
A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain quality. Quality deter...
Quality evaluation decision problem in outsourcing is studied under different information background...
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control ...
Quality certification not only informs consumers, but also stimulates producers to supply better qua...
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations in the pres-ence of adverse ...
The procurement of supplies is often conducted through the buyer analogue of an auction. Sealed bids...
Abstract In this study, we deal with the optimal mutual inspection policies (OMIP) for a manufacture...
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge the quality of the good they receive until af...
<p>In transactions where costly efforts from both the seller and the buyer help prevent selling to t...
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