AbstractThe cryptographic concept of simulatability has become a salient technique for faithfully analyzing and proving security properties of arbitrary cryptographic protocols. We investigate the relationship between simulatability in synchronous and asynchronous frameworks by means of the formal models of Pfitzmann et al., which are seminal in using this concept in order to bridge the gap between the formal-methods and the cryptographic community. We show that the synchronous model can be seen as a special case of the asynchronous one with respect to simulatability, i.e., we present an embedding from the synchronous model into the asynchronous one that we show to preserve simulatability. We show that this result allows for carrying over l...
We use standard linear-time temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system pene...
International audienceFor the design of embedded systems, many languages are in use, which are based...
Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols t...
The cryptographic concept of simulatability has become a salient technique for faithfully analyzing ...
AbstractThe cryptographic concept of simulatability has become a salient technique for faithfully an...
In this work, relations between the security notions standard simulatability and universal simulata...
Abstract. Security-critical systems are an important application area for formal methods. However, s...
AbstractWe define reactive simulatability for general asynchronous systems. Roughly, simulatability ...
Abstract. Simulatability has established itself as a salient notion for defining and proving the sec...
Simulatability constitutes the cryptographic notion of a secure refinement and has asserted its posi...
We introduce a precise definition of the security of reactive systems following the simulatability a...
Abstract. Simulatability has established itself as a salient notion for dening and proving the secur...
Several related research eorts have led to three dierent ways of specifying protocol security prope...
Important properties of many protocols are liveness or availability, i.e., that something good happe...
Ever since the foundational work of Goldwasser and Micali, simulation has proven to be a powerful an...
We use standard linear-time temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system pene...
International audienceFor the design of embedded systems, many languages are in use, which are based...
Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols t...
The cryptographic concept of simulatability has become a salient technique for faithfully analyzing ...
AbstractThe cryptographic concept of simulatability has become a salient technique for faithfully an...
In this work, relations between the security notions standard simulatability and universal simulata...
Abstract. Security-critical systems are an important application area for formal methods. However, s...
AbstractWe define reactive simulatability for general asynchronous systems. Roughly, simulatability ...
Abstract. Simulatability has established itself as a salient notion for defining and proving the sec...
Simulatability constitutes the cryptographic notion of a secure refinement and has asserted its posi...
We introduce a precise definition of the security of reactive systems following the simulatability a...
Abstract. Simulatability has established itself as a salient notion for dening and proving the secur...
Several related research eorts have led to three dierent ways of specifying protocol security prope...
Important properties of many protocols are liveness or availability, i.e., that something good happe...
Ever since the foundational work of Goldwasser and Micali, simulation has proven to be a powerful an...
We use standard linear-time temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system pene...
International audienceFor the design of embedded systems, many languages are in use, which are based...
Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols t...