AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential game solve the respective upper and lower Isaacs' equations in the viscosity sense (introduced by Crandall and Lions (Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 277 (1983), 1–42). Since such solutions are unique, this yields a fairly simple proof that the game has value should the minimax condition hold. As a further application of viscosity techniques, a new and simpler proof that the upper and lower values can be approximated by the values of certain games with Lipschitz controls is given
Recent work by the authors [this Journal, 23 (1985), pp. 566-583], has demonstrated the con-nections...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
We apply a modification of the viscosity solution concept introduced in [8] to the Isaacs equation d...
Recent work by the authors and others has demonstrated the connections between the dynamic programmi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
7 pagesInternational audienceThe value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isa...
Abstract. Motivated by the work of Fleming [5], we shall provide the general framework to associate ...
Recent work by the authors [this Journal, 23 (1985), pp. 566-583], has demonstrated the con-nections...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
We apply a modification of the viscosity solution concept introduced in [8] to the Isaacs equation d...
Recent work by the authors and others has demonstrated the connections between the dynamic programmi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
7 pagesInternational audienceThe value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isa...
Abstract. Motivated by the work of Fleming [5], we shall provide the general framework to associate ...
Recent work by the authors [this Journal, 23 (1985), pp. 566-583], has demonstrated the con-nections...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...