This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model is developed in which identical firms locate in a host country in order to export to a foreign country. These firms are unionized and compete with foreign firms on the foreign market. We consider the incentives for social dumping via restrictive labour legislation, which we assume can be used by the host country government to affect the bargaining power of unions. We ask whether it is in the interest of the importing foreign country for the host country to relax or to tighten labour laws
I show that a foreign firm may sell the same product through both foreign direct investment (FDI) an...
This paper develops a two-country model of international trade with Cournot competition. The labor m...
In this paper we analyze a country's optimal trade policy when its labor market is unionized and fir...
This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model ...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as...
This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model i...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as...
This paper complements the recent game-theoretic literature on foreign direct investment by modellin...
In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting a...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation a...
In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting ...
This paper analyzes the differences between strategic trade and the competitionm policies (in the fo...
In this paper we study the location behaviour of a foreign and a domestic multinational (MNE) compet...
We derive the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the foreign direct investment (FDI) game played b...
I show that a foreign firm may sell the same product through both foreign direct investment (FDI) an...
This paper develops a two-country model of international trade with Cournot competition. The labor m...
In this paper we analyze a country's optimal trade policy when its labor market is unionized and fir...
This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model ...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as...
This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions. An oligopoly model i...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as...
This paper complements the recent game-theoretic literature on foreign direct investment by modellin...
In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting a...
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation a...
In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting ...
This paper analyzes the differences between strategic trade and the competitionm policies (in the fo...
In this paper we study the location behaviour of a foreign and a domestic multinational (MNE) compet...
We derive the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the foreign direct investment (FDI) game played b...
I show that a foreign firm may sell the same product through both foreign direct investment (FDI) an...
This paper develops a two-country model of international trade with Cournot competition. The labor m...
In this paper we analyze a country's optimal trade policy when its labor market is unionized and fir...