AbstractWe study the security property of noninterference for a class of synchronous programs called reactive programs. We consider a core reactive language, obtained by extending the imperative language of Volpano, Smith and Irvine with a form of scheduled parallelism and with reactive primitives that manipulate broadcast signals. The definition of noninterference has to be tuned to the particular nature of reactive computations, which are regulated by a notion of instant. Moreover, a new form of covert channel may arise in reactive computations, called suspension leak. We give a formulation of noninterference based on bisimulation, as is now usual for concurrent languages. We then propose a type system to enforce this property in our lang...
The reactive programming model is largely different to what we're used to as we don't have a full co...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies...
AbstractWe study the security property of noninterference for a class of synchronous programs called...
We propose a type system to enforce the security property of noninterference in a core reactive lang...
Many programs operate reactively-patiently waiting for user input, running for a while producing out...
Abstract. We propose a type system to ensure the property of nonin-terference in a system of concurr...
AbstractWe propose a type system to ensure the property of noninterference in a system of concurrent...
International audienceWe study the security property of noninterference in a core synchronous reacti...
Abstract. We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for prov-ing possibilistic non...
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies...
We study unwinding conditions for the definition of non-interference properties of a simple imperati...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Information flow type systems provide an elegant means to enforce confidentiality of programs. Using...
AbstractIn this note we revisit the so-called reactive programming style, which evolves from the syn...
The reactive programming model is largely different to what we're used to as we don't have a full co...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies...
AbstractWe study the security property of noninterference for a class of synchronous programs called...
We propose a type system to enforce the security property of noninterference in a core reactive lang...
Many programs operate reactively-patiently waiting for user input, running for a while producing out...
Abstract. We propose a type system to ensure the property of nonin-terference in a system of concurr...
AbstractWe propose a type system to ensure the property of noninterference in a system of concurrent...
International audienceWe study the security property of noninterference in a core synchronous reacti...
Abstract. We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for prov-ing possibilistic non...
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies...
We study unwinding conditions for the definition of non-interference properties of a simple imperati...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Information flow type systems provide an elegant means to enforce confidentiality of programs. Using...
AbstractIn this note we revisit the so-called reactive programming style, which evolves from the syn...
The reactive programming model is largely different to what we're used to as we don't have a full co...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies...