AbstractRelaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage problem to arbitrary posets, we show after adjusting the notion of stability to the new problem that the set of stable marriages still forms a distributive lattice
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals attempt to optimize their ...
The stable marriage problem is the following: given n men and n women, each man with a list ranking ...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
Relaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage problem to a...
AbstractRelaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage prob...
AbstractWe consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indiffer...
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in ...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
AbstractBlair (J. Combin. Theory Ser. A 37 (1984), 353–356) showed that every finite distributive la...
AbstractA stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates pr...
Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the pr...
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most ge...
This thesis presents and verifies the works of Balinski and Ratier on Graphs and Marriages published...
In this paper the well-known Stable Marriage Problem is considered once again. The name of this pro...
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals attempt to optimize their ...
The stable marriage problem is the following: given n men and n women, each man with a list ranking ...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
Relaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage problem to a...
AbstractRelaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage prob...
AbstractWe consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indiffer...
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in ...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
AbstractBlair (J. Combin. Theory Ser. A 37 (1984), 353–356) showed that every finite distributive la...
AbstractA stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates pr...
Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the pr...
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most ge...
This thesis presents and verifies the works of Balinski and Ratier on Graphs and Marriages published...
In this paper the well-known Stable Marriage Problem is considered once again. The name of this pro...
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals attempt to optimize their ...
The stable marriage problem is the following: given n men and n women, each man with a list ranking ...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
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