AbstractUsing a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived
In this paper I define a static marriage game with a continuum of players, when the traits of men an...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn the context of coalition formation g...
Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is sh...
AbstractUsing a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. ...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics...
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one si...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restri...
In this paper I define a static marriage game with a continuum of players, when the traits of men an...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn the context of coalition formation g...
Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is sh...
AbstractUsing a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. ...
AbstractThe stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no ...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption o...
Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics...
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one si...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
The stable matching problem is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized se...
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restri...
In this paper I define a static marriage game with a continuum of players, when the traits of men an...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn the context of coalition formation g...
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