AbstractIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an extension of that of value, has been recently proposed to measure the overall influence of coalitions in games. Axiomatizations of two classes of generalized values, namely probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues, which extend probabilistic values and semivalues, respectively, are first proposed. The axioms we utilize are based on natural extensions of axioms involved in the axiomatizations of values. In the second half of the paper, special instances of generalized semivalues are also axiomatized
The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues extend the notion of binomial semivalue to games with ...
In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is ...
A transferable utility (TU) game with n players specifies a vector of (Formula presented.) real numb...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is...
AbstractIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an e...
he paper provides two characterizations of probabilistic values satisfying three classical axioms (l...
A new characterization of a solution concept for the generalized game, a cooperative defined on the ...
Multinomial probabilistic values were first introduced by one of us in reliability and later on by t...
We introduce a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players’ attitudes wit...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index, which ca...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-014-0356-6”.We f...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which...
An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on t...
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the...
The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues extend the notion of binomial semivalue to games with ...
In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is ...
A transferable utility (TU) game with n players specifies a vector of (Formula presented.) real numb...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is...
AbstractIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an e...
he paper provides two characterizations of probabilistic values satisfying three classical axioms (l...
A new characterization of a solution concept for the generalized game, a cooperative defined on the ...
Multinomial probabilistic values were first introduced by one of us in reliability and later on by t...
We introduce a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players’ attitudes wit...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index, which ca...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11750-014-0356-6”.We f...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which...
An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on t...
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in Handbook of the...
The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues extend the notion of binomial semivalue to games with ...
In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is ...
A transferable utility (TU) game with n players specifies a vector of (Formula presented.) real numb...