Information Sharing in a Supply Chain under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper investigates information sharing issues in supply chains with different structures. Adopting a game-theoretic method, we start the analysis from a simple bilateral monopoly supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The model is then extended to a scenario with two competing retailers. The manufacturer provides the wholesale price and invests in carbon emission abatement level. The retailers order products to meet consumers' demand in an uncertain market. One retailer has the power to obtain private information. The results show that the wholesale price and the carbon emission abatement level respond positively to the demand signal. We find that the well-informed retailer is better off with low-demand information sharing and worse off with high-demand information sharing in a bilateral monopoly supply chain. However, the well-informed retailer can benefit from high-demand information sharing in a competitive environment. We also find that the uninformed retailer may get hurt from information sharing under certain conditions. Moreover, the manufacturer's expected profit is related to the capability of abating carbon emissions, the information accuracy, and the demand uncertainty