We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player’s own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so. We find that behavior is responsive to the dependence on others who might fail in backward induction as well as information regarding their backward induction skills
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
We investigate the relevance of conditional reasoning and belief formation for the occurrence of th...
In this paper we investigate the necessary ingredients for an accurate model of belief formation. Us...
We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a probl...
Backward induction is a benchmark of game theoretic rationality, yet surprisingly little is known as...
We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward inductio...
<div><p>We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward ...
This paper presents a first attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of st...
Backward induction has been the standard method of solving finite extensive-form games with perfect ...
This paper studies psychological forward induction and the updating of beliefs in the lost wallet ga...
Can we learn about the future from observing past decisions? The present thesis revolves around this...
We investigate an extension of the notion of backward induction to dynamic games with imperfect info...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
We investigate the relevance of conditional reasoning and belief formation for the occurrence of th...
In this paper we investigate the necessary ingredients for an accurate model of belief formation. Us...
We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a probl...
Backward induction is a benchmark of game theoretic rationality, yet surprisingly little is known as...
We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward inductio...
<div><p>We present experimental evidence on two forms of iterated reasoning in games, i.e. backward ...
This paper presents a first attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of st...
Backward induction has been the standard method of solving finite extensive-form games with perfect ...
This paper studies psychological forward induction and the updating of beliefs in the lost wallet ga...
Can we learn about the future from observing past decisions? The present thesis revolves around this...
We investigate an extension of the notion of backward induction to dynamic games with imperfect info...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
We investigate the relevance of conditional reasoning and belief formation for the occurrence of th...
In this paper we investigate the necessary ingredients for an accurate model of belief formation. Us...