Immaginazione, attenzione e raffigurazione

Philosophers have long been interested in the various similarities and differences between perception and imagination. One of the most interesting purported differences is the relationship that attention bears to each. Colin McGinn (2004), especially, has provided a comprehensive discussion of these relations, pointing out that imagery, unlike perceptual experiences (percepts), essentially requires attention, presents no equivalent of the visual field for attention to explore, lacks saturation, and cannot provide new information about what is imagined. Moreover, McGinn and others have also maintained that images, like percepts, are transparent. In this paper I will examine all of these claims, arguing first that there are few good reasons to accept the differences between imagery and perceptual experiences in respect of the role that attention is supposed to play in each, and secondly, that in any case the transparency claim is in tension with the other claims made about imagery. I conclude that the most salient difference between imagination and perception consists in the non-attributive phenomenology of the former. Finally, I turn briefly to some implications of this characteristic of imagining for the nature of pictorial depiction, arguing against the plausibility of accounts that attempt to explain it by appealing to the imagination