Quanto è inemendabile l’esperienza? Realismo, senso comune e scienza della mente

In this paper, I attempt to oppose the notion of perceptual unamendability proposed by Ferraris to the reductionism dominating the mainstream approaches in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In particular, my purpose is to challenge the idea that experience is nothing but the product of the brain and that common sense psychology is a theory out of fashion that has to be replaced with the acquisitions of neuroscience. The revaluation of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in the context of the sensorimotor approach (confirmed by the supporters of embodied cognitive science) provides the theoretical framework in which I intend to develop my theory. According to my thesis, the amendability concerns the conditions of action and perception more than their practical exercise. The negotiations we make with the basic features of our environment are developed through a process of continuous corrections which is virtually infinite, although restricted by ecological and temporal limits