2.1. Meinonghianismo modale e fiction: il meglio di tre mondi

I propose a neo-Meinongian theory labelled as “Modal Meinongian Metaphysics” (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In section 1, I make the idea explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In section 2, I introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In sections 3 to 5, I discuss the approaches of traditional Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism – and their main troubles. In section 6 I propose the MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (sect. 6.1); (2) a Qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (sect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (sect. 6.3). In section 7 I present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in section 8 I show how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories