FIRST MODERN INSTITUTIONS OF COMPETITION REGULATION – LAW AND ECONOMICS OR LAW VERSUS ECONOMICS?

Competition regulation nowadays is a result of a nexus of many intertwined phenomena, which under different circumstances might bring different results. Throughout the history of this process it is easy to observe quite complicated relationship between economic theories of competition and theory and practice of law. It might look, as if institutions regulating competition are simple realisation of economic theories. The truth is different, as competition regulation originated in times, when complex theoretical analysis of that type was not condemning trusts and was generally leaning towards self-regulatory powers of competition. The main theme of this paper is an attempt to identify the way of introducing the first modern competition regulation law. In the conclusion, the paper substantiates the hypothesis, that the economics played insignificant role in the whole process, it even might be stated, that the Sherman Antitrust Act was introduced despite the economists’ scepticism towards such way of regulation of markets. In the analysis other explanations for the Act emerge: one rooted in public choice theory, the other taking into consideration motives of possible personal revenge of Sen. Sherman.