Great Powers and the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895

The objective of this study is to present and analyse the course and consequences of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and its relation to the Great Powers’ policies in the Far East. The general dispositions of both participants is assessed, as is Japan’s successful start after the outbreak of the war, the causes of China’s military catastrophes (Pyongyang, Port Arthur, Weihaiwei) and the fact that the Manchu elite had totally failed to comprehend the severity of the situation, thus endangering the basis of the Qing Dynasty regime. Of the Great Powers with concerns in the Far East, the most importance were the stances of Russia and Great Britain, while Germany’s position took a somewhat careful course. The path to concluding peace was very complex not just as a result of obstructions from both parties to the conflict, but also due to the hesitant approach of the Great Powers, Great Britain in particular. By signing the peace treaty in Shimonoseki, Japan, on 17 April 1895, China accepted Japan’s punitive terms which were somewhat lessened through the so-called Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany, which resulted in China being returned the Liaodong Peninsula. The course and outcome of the war had exceptionally serious consequences for the overall situation in the Far East. Japan, the new main regional power, acquired massive funds which it was able to use for arming itself and preparing for further war. A weakened China was unable to withstand increasing pressures from the Great Powers and other countries, and these countries soon began endeavours to lease parts of China’s territory, receive concessions for railway construction and mineral mining, and restrict its spheres of influence