(From the publisher) In daily life we take it for granted that our minds have conscious control of our actions, at least for most of the time. But many scientists and philosophers deny that this is really the case, because there is no generally accepted theory of how the mind interacts with the body. Max Velmans presents a non-reductive solution to the problem, in which 'conscious mental control' includes ‘voluntary’ operations of the preconscious mind. On this account, biological determinism is compatible with experienced free will. Velmans’ theory is put to the test by nine critics: Ron Chrisley, Todd Feinberg, Jeffrey Gray, John Kihlstrom, Sam Rakover, Ramakrishna Rao, Aaron Sloman, Steve Torrance and Robert Van Gulick
Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have ...
Various researchers have tried to show that conscious thoughts (or more generally, conscious states...
<p>The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett...
In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and th...
This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences aff...
This is a target article for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. In everyday li...
This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002) 'How could conscious experiences affe...
The article focuses on the issue of brain determinism, by examining two recent neuroscien-tific expe...
The general consensus is that the brain is something different from the mind: it is made of physical...
The mind-body problem is analyzed in a reductionist perspective. By combining the concepts of emerge...
The debate on mind–brain relationships has been centered on issues of free will. I investigate the d...
<p>The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett...
Psychosomatic medicine assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported...
We argue, contra Joshua Knobe in a companion chapter, that most people have an understanding of free...
There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental cau...
Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have ...
Various researchers have tried to show that conscious thoughts (or more generally, conscious states...
<p>The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett...
In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and th...
This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences aff...
This is a target article for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. In everyday li...
This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002) 'How could conscious experiences affe...
The article focuses on the issue of brain determinism, by examining two recent neuroscien-tific expe...
The general consensus is that the brain is something different from the mind: it is made of physical...
The mind-body problem is analyzed in a reductionist perspective. By combining the concepts of emerge...
The debate on mind–brain relationships has been centered on issues of free will. I investigate the d...
<p>The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett...
Psychosomatic medicine assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported...
We argue, contra Joshua Knobe in a companion chapter, that most people have an understanding of free...
There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental cau...
Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have ...
Various researchers have tried to show that conscious thoughts (or more generally, conscious states...
<p>The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett...