Conformity in numbers-Does criticality in social responses exist?

Within this paper we explore the idea of a critical value representing the proportion of majority members within a group that affects dramatic changes in influence targets' conformity. We consider the threshold q-voter model when the responses of the Willis-Nail model, a well-established two-dimensional model of social response, are used as a foundation. Specifically, we study a generalized threshold q-voter model when all basic types of social response described by Willis-Nail model are considered, i.e. conformity, anticonformity, independence, and uniformity/congruence. These responses occur in our model with complementary probabilities. We introduce independently two thresholds: one needed for conformity, as well as a second one for anticonformity. In the case of conformity, at least r individuals among q neighbors have to share the same opinion in order to persuade a voter to follow majority's opinion, whereas in the case of anticonformity, at least w individuals among q neighbors have to share the same opinion in order to influence voters to take an opinion that goes against that of their own reference group. We solve the model on a complete graph and show that the threshold for conformity significantly influences the results. For example, there is a critical threshold for conformity above which the system behaves as in the case of unanimity, i.e. displays continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. On the other hand, the threshold for anticonformity is almost irrelevant. We discuss our results from the perspective of theories of social psychology, as well as the philosophy of agent-based modeling