We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with perfectly transferable utilities. We do so without imposing parametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity and with data on one large market. We provide a tractable characterisation of the identified set under various classes of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity. Using our methodology, we re-examine some of the relevant questions in the empirical literature on the marriage market, which have been previously studied under the Logit assumption. Our results reveal that many findings in the aforementioned literature are primarily driven by such parametric restrictions
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
We consider the one-to-one matching models with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and S...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our ...
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets us...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
This paper provides a unifying framework of one-to-one and many-to-one matching without transfers an...
This paper considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, in two-sided markets. ...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with p...
We consider the one-to-one matching models with transfers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and S...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
In this paper we propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our ...
We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets us...
We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility when some of the characteris...
This paper provides a unifying framework of one-to-one and many-to-one matching without transfers an...
This paper considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, in two-sided markets. ...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...
In this paper, we argue that models coming from a variety of fields share a common structure that we...
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and sep...
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and...
This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demand...
This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agent...
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteri...