The Politics of Compliance with International Human Rights Court Judgments

Courts are increasingly important for domestic and international politics. Yet, judicial power is limited by courts’ reliance on other actors to implement their rulings. This dissertation examines the politics of compliance with European Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgments. A central finding is that compliance is affected by judgment characteristics, which can be influenced by the judges. By providing remedial indications, judges can facilitate compliance monitoring and provide political cover for the implementation of unpopular measures. By contrast, judicial dissent can increase compliance problems by undermining a judgment’s social legitimacy and providing justifications for non-compliance. Compliance is also affected by the domestic politics of the respondent state. Veto-player problems tend to delay compliance when legislative changes are needed. Accountability institutions are important for facilitating domestic enforcement of judgments. Finally, fierce political competition creates incentives for sustaining the international human rights judiciary and can therefore increase the willingness to implement costly rulings