This paper analyzes sovereign bondholdings by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign default episodes over 1998–2012, establishing two robust facts. First, banks hold many government bonds (on average 9% of assets) in normal times, particularly banks making fewer loans and operating in less financially-developed countries. Second, during default years, banks with the average exposure to government bonds exhibit a lower growth rate of loans than banks without bonds (7-percentage points lower). These results indicate that the “dangerous embrace” between banks and their government plays a key role during sovereign defaults and its strength depends on local conditions.Gennaioli thanks the European Research Council (grant ERC-GA 241114)....
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with the bankin...
We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ...
Note: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Ba...
This paper analyzes sovereign bondholdings by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign default...
Empirical analysis of holdings of sovereign bonds by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign ...
We analyze empirically the holdings of sovereign bonds by over 20,000 banks in 191 countries, and th...
We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults ...
This paper explores two mechanisms through which a sovereign default can disrupt the domestic econom...
We study the link between sovereign default, domestic credit markets and financial institutions, bot...
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with the bankin...
The strong relation between sovereign and banking stress is frequently emphasised, especially since ...
Abstract. This study seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign def...
This paper studies the international propagation of sovereign debt default. We posit a two-country e...
The crisis has underlined the strong interdependence between the euro-area banking and sovereign cri...
This paper studies sovereign debt crises during the period 1993-2006 through the prism of the primar...
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with the bankin...
We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ...
Note: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Ba...
This paper analyzes sovereign bondholdings by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign default...
Empirical analysis of holdings of sovereign bonds by 20,000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign ...
We analyze empirically the holdings of sovereign bonds by over 20,000 banks in 191 countries, and th...
We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults ...
This paper explores two mechanisms through which a sovereign default can disrupt the domestic econom...
We study the link between sovereign default, domestic credit markets and financial institutions, bot...
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with the bankin...
The strong relation between sovereign and banking stress is frequently emphasised, especially since ...
Abstract. This study seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign def...
This paper studies the international propagation of sovereign debt default. We posit a two-country e...
The crisis has underlined the strong interdependence between the euro-area banking and sovereign cri...
This paper studies sovereign debt crises during the period 1993-2006 through the prism of the primar...
Episodes of sovereign default feature three key empirical regularities in connection with the bankin...
We use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks to evaluate the impact of government ...
Note: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Ba...