There are many difficulties of the mind-brain identity theory. One of them is the problem that mental properties (such as incorrigibility, privileged, access, privacy, etc.) are not reducible to physical properties. In this paper, we argued that this difficulty cannot get any trouble into identity theory, because mental state have not these properties
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Feigl, Place and Smart offered an answer to the mind‑body proble...
Abstract: The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serio...
This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the ques...
The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Plac...
The question of the human ‘mind' and its relation with the ‘body' has remained a controversial issue...
Philosophers have long asked the questions, “What is the nature of mental phenomena?” and “What is t...
This work examines and critically evaluates the proposal that phenomenal properties, or the subjecti...
The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from ...
In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of ...
My thesis analyzes and compares alternative theories of mind. In the course of providing an expositi...
Here I present a mind-object identity theory based on a straightforward hypothesis: One's experience...
This dissertation centers on issues central to a scientific account of mental entities. In part I, I...
It is a common notion that we have minds or souls in addition to or distinct from our bodies. This c...
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Feigl, Place and Smart offered an answer to the mind‑body proble...
Abstract: The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serio...
This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the ques...
The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Plac...
The question of the human ‘mind' and its relation with the ‘body' has remained a controversial issue...
Philosophers have long asked the questions, “What is the nature of mental phenomena?” and “What is t...
This work examines and critically evaluates the proposal that phenomenal properties, or the subjecti...
The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from ...
In this essay I shall argue that the crucial assumptions of Kripke's argument, i.e. the collapse of ...
My thesis analyzes and compares alternative theories of mind. In the course of providing an expositi...
Here I present a mind-object identity theory based on a straightforward hypothesis: One's experience...
This dissertation centers on issues central to a scientific account of mental entities. In part I, I...
It is a common notion that we have minds or souls in addition to or distinct from our bodies. This c...
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Feigl, Place and Smart offered an answer to the mind‑body proble...
Abstract: The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serio...
This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the ques...