Is the Mind in Mencius' Philosophy Self-Sufficient for Moral Cultivation?

本文要指出，《孟子》在討論道德實踐時，心不是最後的存有學基礎，它尚需奠基於天，因此本文認為，心在道德實踐時不是自足的。但是，當代的孟子哲學詮釋者大都認為心是自足的。對於這種主張，我稱為心靈自足論。本文首先介紹這種理論的源起，再提出三個論證來指出它在理論上的困難。跟著，我提出以天為道德實踐的存有學基礎，並嘗試以這個主張來詮釋孟子的道德實踐理論。對於這種詮釋，我稱之為「以天為基礎的詮釋」。最後，我發現這種詮釋能避免心靈自足論所導致的困難，且又一致於《孟子》的語言。所以，我認為這種詮釋是更妥當的。Some contemporary interpreters of Mencius' philosophy think that Mencian moral cultivation depends upon the "conscience" (liang chih良知) of human beings. Since conscience is the defining characteristic of human beings and can offer moral guidance to them, by obeying the guidance of conscience, one can by himself accomplish moral cultivation, and can even achieve sagehood. Tu Wei-Ming states this position clearly