The Debate Over the Modularity of Cognitive Structure

本文探討人類心智構造的模組程度問題，著重在如何掌握最小模組論與演化心理學的大量模組假設之間的爭議。最小模組論的「模組」概念與演化心理學的「模組」概念有非常大的差異，這不僅是由於前者將「資訊膠封性」視為模組的要件，而演化心理學並不接受，甚至就連雙方關於「論域特定性」的理解也不同。但本文不將雙方的歧異視為表面的文字或概念之爭。本文論述，一方面從最小模組論的立場來說，由於中央系統的機制大都具有整體論的性質以及等方位的性質，它們是資訊不膠封的，這一點是演化心理學無法否認的；另一方面，本文對大量模組假設提出六點批駁，並結論：即使在大量模組假設下，不以「資訊膠封」作為模組的標準，而以「功能分殊」以及「適應難題」取而代之，中央系統的心理機制仍未必是大量模組的。This essay investigates the problem about the modularity of central cognitive architecture, focusing on how to grasp the debate between Fodorian minimal modularism and the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) proposed by evolutionary psychologists. Both conceive of the idea of "modularity" in different ways. While minimal modularism takes "informational encapsulation" to be essential to modules, the MMH does not. Furthermore, their idea of "domain specificity" does not even agree. This essay does not take the debate to be mere verbal issue. Instead, this essay argues that from the minimal modularist point of view, due to the holistic and isotropic features essential to central mechanisms, such mechanisms are informationally unencapsulated and hence are not modular in the Fodorian sense. This is something not denied by evolutionary psychology. This essay then raises six objections to the MMH and concludes accordingly that even on the MMH conception of modularity, the central cognitive system need not be massively modular