Analysis of Taiwan High School Matching System

前三志願招不滿人，會考高分名落孫山，民國103年我國十二年國教正式開始實施，同年一併啟用的高中入學新制卻是爭議不斷。本文以Gale and Shapley (1962) 提出的學校錄取問題為理論基礎，嘗試回答我國民國103年高中入學制度為何會導致學生與學校之間出現不效率的分配結果，並參考紐約高中入學制度的變革經驗，對我國的制度提出具體的改革建議。分析結果發現，我國民國103年的高中入學制度會產生不穩定分配，並讓學生與學校都有謊報志願序的誘因，進而產生不效率的分配結果。對於上述問題，我們提出四項制度改革建議：一、將免試入學與特色招生合併一起填志願分發且先行公佈特色招生學校志願序；二、取消志願序填寫數量上限；三、志願序不納入比項；四、開放各校於限制範圍內自訂超額比序標準。In 2014, the matching result of Taiwan’s high school admission system had been controversial. Some good schools didn’t receive enough application from students, and some good students didn’t receive offers from schools. This paper is based on the college admission problem theorem of Gale and Shapley (1962), trying to find the reasons of the inefficient result of Taiwan’s high school admission system and provide some specific recommendations. The result shows that Taiwan’s high school admission system in 2014 would generate unstable matching result, and give both the schools and the students incentives to lie on their preference list, resulting in the inefficient result. Due to the problems above, we provide five recommendations of policy: (a) Combine the Exam-Free Admission and the Special Examination Admissions’ preference lists, with the preference list of the Special Examination Admissions pre-announced. (b) Cancel the limit of preference lists. (c) Remove the preference score from the Examinations-Free Entrance Competition. (d) Change the deferred-acceptance procedure from school-proposing to student-proposing. (e) Allow different schools to have different Examinations-Free Entrance Competition