Earnings management, audit quality and management changes

本文探討當管理階層變動時，管理階層是否會藉由盈餘管理以達成其自身利 益，以及審計品質對於管理階層變動產⽣生之盈餘管理的影響。本研究將管理階層 變動分為董事長變動、總經理變動、董事長與總經理合併觀察、會計主管變動共四部分，實證分析發現，無論於董事長、總經理或合併觀察⽽而⾔言，變動之當期對於應計項目之盈餘管理皆為顯著負相關，⽽而實質盈餘管理則未達顯著標準；在變動次期之部分，未有證據顯示董事長、總經理會透過應計項目影響盈餘，然⽽而，董事長之變動次期對於實質盈餘管理為顯著正相關，顯示董事長變動之次期可能 會透過偏離正常的營運活動調升公司盈餘，在總經理變動之情況則未發現此現象；在會計主管變動部分，於所有結果皆未達顯著標準，並無證據顯示會計主管變動會對盈餘管理有所影響；於審計品質部分，未發現證據顯示審計品質較佳之⼤大型事務所能減輕管理階層變動下，對於盈餘管理之影響。In this paper, I invetigate whether managers use earnings management for self interest while management changes and relation between audit quality and management changes. Management changes are defined as: (1) board of director changes (2) chief executive officer changes (3) one of borad of director or chief executive officer change (4) accounting manager changes. I find board of director changes, chief executive officer changes and one of them changes are significant negative to discretionary accrual but no significant relationship between changes and real earnings management in the year of changes. There is no relationship between discretionary accrual and management changes in the following year but board of director changes is significant positive relate to real earnings management in the following year. Suggest that board of director increases earnings by manipulate real operating activities. I find no relationship between accounting manager changes and earnings management. There is no evidence that Big 4 reduce earnings management during management changes