Earning Management and M&A method of payment- Case of Taiwan Corporate Takeover

公司進行盈餘管理有諸多誘因，而併購案件為其中之一。併購前如果該交易案為換股模式的併購方公司，管理階層為了避免付出過多溢價以及減少併購成本如盈餘稀釋，其有動機向上管理裁量性應計數，使每股盈餘上升間接刺激股價上升，在換股交易的模式中則可減少因支付收購對價所需發出的股數。本篇論文主要探討公司在進行併購前是否會有操縱盈餘的情況使裁量性應計數上升，並進一步區分不同的交易手法探討在不同情況中，換股收購、現金收購間裁量性應計數是否有顯著之差異。 本篇論文以台灣資本市場中西元2002~2011年共695筆併購樣本，並分類出換股收購121筆及現金收購308筆資料，主要研究區間為涉及併購時點前三年以及後一年的資料，以此檢視台灣的資本市場併購交易前管理階層是否有盈餘管理的情況。 實證結果顯示，未區分支付手法前併購方公司雖有管理裁量性應計數向上的情況但並不顯著，進一步區分支付手法後，換股收購下管理裁量性應計數向上的情況為顯著，而現金收購情況下管理裁量性應計數向上的情況則不顯著，證實了假說一；兩種交易手法的異常應計數有顯著的差異則證實了假說二。There are various motivations which encourage the management of the firm to do earning management. In this thesis we discuss the earning management before merger and acquisition activities happen. Before issuing shares to buy target firm , acquirers usually did earning management upward and therefore indirectly affect their stock price up to reduce shares issued. Reducing shares issued can lower the cost of acquisition by avoid earning per share dilution and overpayment for synergy. This thesis discuss whether this situation exist in Taiwan capital market. The focus is on discretionary accruals as a measure of managers’ earnings manipulation. To estimate discretionary and non-discretionary components of total accruals the modified Jones model is adopted Firms are selected from both listed cash and share acquirers firms on Taiwan capital market in the period of 2002-2011 which contain 695 samples. After filtering samples, we categorize by method of payment into shares purchase with 121 samples and cash purchase with 308 samples. The results indicated strong evidence that share acquirer firms manipulated their earnings preceding acquisition announcement date. Cash acquirers shows no evidence of earning management