Effects of Creditor Governance, Board Characteristics and Ownership Structure on Bank Performance and Risk Taking

本研究以銀行治理的行業特殊性出發，聚焦於存款戶等債權人權益之保護，與銀行業風險控管之重視。除了探討一般公司治理變數中獨立董監事、機構法人持股與董監事專業性對銀行經營績效及風險承擔之影響外，尚加入了關係人放款，定義其為債權治理變數，一併分析其影響。本研究利用2006年至2013年，台灣24家銀行的年資料進行研究。實證結果顯示當關係人放款比重越高時，會降低經營績效表現，並提高銀行的逾放比與破產風險。再者，獨立董監事的比率越高對於經營績效沒有影響，而機構法人持股與董監事的專業性皆能夠提升績效表現。另外，獨立董監事、機構法人持股與董監事專業性，三個公司治理變數皆能夠有效降低銀行的風險承擔。Starting from the industry-specific features of bank governance, this paper focuses on the role of stakeholders, especially creditors of banks and the emphasis on the risk management. Not only do we investigate effects of board independence, institutional ownership and board expertise on bank performance and risk taking, we also define related lending as a variable of creditor governance and analyze its influence. Using the dataset of 24 banks from Taiwan during 2006-2013, the evidence shows that a higher related lending would reduce the bank performance and increase both non-performing loan and insolvency risk. In addition, board independence has no effect on performance, while banks with higher ratio of institutional ownership and board expertise can perform better. The empirical results also show that board independence, institutional ownership and board expertise can reduce bank risk taking effectively