Controlling shareholders, Market Timing and Share Issuance

本篇論文使用1997年至2013年台灣證券市場上市公司資料來探討控制股東持股改變和股票發行對公司股票報酬的影響。研究結果顯示在公司發行股票伴隨著控制持股大幅減少的情形下，未來報酬會較差。我們發現在股票發行量較高時，此現象會更明顯。而在無新股發行的情況下，控制股東間單純買賣股票和未來股票報酬的關係則不明確。我們也研究股票發行前的各種公司變數，發現股票周轉率和不同種類股票的發行呈正向的關係，其效果包括控制持股大量稀釋以及控制持股大量增加的股票。 This dissertation analyzes the relation between stock returns and share issuance with the change of the stake of controlling shareholders by using securities market data in Taiwan from 1997 to 2013. Empirical results suggest that future returns are poor when firms experience a decline in the stake of controlling shareholders after equity issuance. This implies that controlling shareholders may be able to time the market. The findings are more significant in hot issue markets. When there is no issuance of firm stock, the relation between change in the stake of controlling shareholders and future returns is uncertain. As for firm characteristics before issuance, the higher the stock turnover, the more likely firm issues shares whether controlling shareholders decrease or increase their shares